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THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD
Recent rial Court Decisions
(Editor's Note.-It is intended in each
issue of the Record to print decisions of
all the local Trial Courts decided within
the preceding thirty days upon novel
questions of law or upon points as to which
there is no Colorado Supreme Court de-
cision. The co-operation of the members
of the Bar is solicited in making this de-
partment a success. Any attorney having
knowledge of such a decision is requested
to phone or mail the title of the case to the
Secretary of this Association, who will di-
gest the decision for this department.
The names of the Courts having no mater-
ial for the current month will be omitted,
due to lack of space.)
DIVISION III. JUDGE BUTLER
Eminent Domain. Procedure before
Commissioners.
Commissioners appointed under Emi-
nent Domain Act of 1911 (Comp. L. Sec.
9076, et seq.) held informal hearings, at
which no oath was administered; they
obtained information from various sources,
not under oath; but they gave objector
every reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to present testimony. He appeared
and made oral statements, and afterward
filed a written statement relative to his
property. Held, that under the act of
1911, unlike the general Eminent Domain
act (Comp. L. Sec. 6311, et seq.), the pro-
ceedings before the commissioners are pre-
liminary, and are not strictly judicial; that
a full hearing upon the merits before a
judge or a jury may be had at the option
of the objector, and that the informal
character of the proceedings before the
commissioners does not necessitate the
setting aside of their report. Routt
County Development Co. v. Johnson, 23
Colo. App. 511, and Pueblo v. Shutt Inv.
Co., 28 Colo. 524 construed the general
Eminent Domain act, and have no appli-
cation to this case.
Denver v. Potter et al., No. 86801.
DIVISION IV.
JUDGE STARKWEATHER
Corporations-Funds Misapplied by Offi-
cer Impressed with Trust in Hands of
Other Corporation with Knowledge:
President of -A and B corporations
diverted money from A corporation to B
corporation, which was used to purchase
property for B corporation. Diversion of
funds made A corporation insolvent and
trustee in bankruptcy brings suit to im-
press property of B corporation with trust
to the amount of diverted funds.
Shown that president controlled both
Boards of Directors and had diverted
funds by creating a large personal credit
on books of A corporation as salary for
himself, contrary to the by-law provisions
for no salaries, and had set off diversions
to other corporation against so-called
claim for salaries.
Held: The knowledge of the president
of the A and B corporations of the diver-
sion of said funds was the knowledge of the
B corporation and the property of said
corporation thereby became impressed
with the trust to the amount thereof and
trustee granted a lien on the property of
B corporation to the extent of said diver-
sions.
Bailey, Trustee vs. Riant, No. 89209.
DIVISION V. JUDGE SACKMAN
Banks in Liquidation-Sale of Assets
Deputy Bank Commissioner granted
authority to sell certain assets of the bank
at public auction. Attorney authorized
to bid up to $20,000 for client; failed to
bid when Deputy Bank Commissioner
announced $25,000 minimum bid. No
bidders appearing for that sum, Deputy
Bank Commissioner asked and received
authority to sell same at private sale, sub-
ject to confirmation by court. "A" offe'ed
$18,000 for assets. Deputy Bank Com-
missioner tentatively accepted offer and
petitioned the court for leave to sell ac-
cordingly. Day before hearing "B," whose
attorney had failed to bid at public auc-
tion, offered to buy for $18,500 and at
hearing submitted written offer and ten-
dered certified check therefor. "A" main-
tained tentative acceptance of smaller
offer by Deputy Bank Commissioner
should be -recognized by court. At hear-
ing, Deputy Bank Commissioner testified
that in his opinion, the smaller offer should
be accepted as a matter of precedent.
Held: The interests of the depositors
are the primary interests to be protected
and the sale of the assets of a bank in the
hands of the Deputy Bank Commissioner,
being subject to confirmation by the court,
any tentative acceptance by Deputy Bank
Commissioner of offer to buy said assets
is subject to confirmation by the court.
The tentative acceptance of an offer by
the Deputy Bank Commissioner gives the
offeror no vested rights. The court is
solely interested in obtaining the greatest
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possible amount for distribution among the
depositors, and ordered that another public
auction be held, at which both of said
parties and others might bid and any bids
or offers received thereat to be subject to
confirmation by the court.
Id. Following said order, "A" request-
ed five and twenty-five days stay of execu-
tion pending appeal.
Held: No stay proper under the facts,
and stay of execution denied.
in re Bank of Commerce.
COUNTY COURT JUDGE LUXFORD
Widow's Allowance-Separate Mainte-
nance Agreement as Waiver of:
Widow, alleged to have been absent
from Colorado during the year of adminis-
tration of estate of deceased husband, files
application for widow's allowance shortly
before closing of estate and elects to take
$2,000 cash in lieu of personalty. Admin-
istrator, as a bar to said application, pre-
sents separation agreement dated 1920.
executed by respective parties following
institution of separate maintenance suit,
whereby deceased husband gave wife
$1500 alleged to have been all the property
then owned by him, the agreement provid-
ing that the execution thereof and accept-
ance of said sum by widow should bar any
further claim against husband or his es-
tate, etc., and that presentation of agree-
ment in any court, wherein such claim
might be made, should constitute bar to
any such suit. Widow's allowance not
specifically mentioned.
Held: Widow entitled to widow's
allowance.
In re Estate of William E. Gray No.
36024 (Above matter appealed to District
Court, No. 93417. Will be reported here
when decided there.)
(In this connection, see Wilson vs.
Wilson, 55 Colo. 70, holding, "An ante-
nuptial agreement wherein the wife relin-
quished all interest in the husband's estate
with a provision, however, for her support
should she survive him, would not bar her
widow's allowance or would not waive her
right to it."
JUSTICE COURT
JUDGE A. T. ORAHOOD
Justice of the Peace-Power to Amend
Process:
Paul Smith was served with summons in
which name of defendant read "B. Smith"
by mistake. Plaintiff asked leave of Court
to amend summons to insert correct name
of defendant at time of trial.
Held: The Justice of the Peace has
power to amend process after service to
state the true facts and a person served
with process out of Justice Court wherein
his name is misspelled is put upon notice,
and must appear and defend and if he does
not do so, process may be amended to state
correct facts, or if judgment against
defendant under erroneous name is enter-
ed, the property of the defendant will be
bound as if name were correct, the rights
of third party not intervening.
-4 Municipal Court for Denver?
Suggestions for the remedy of the over-
crowded conditions in the justice of the
peace and police courts of Denver have so
far consisted in the advocacy of the addi-
tion of one or more justices of the pe .ce,
to operate under the same methods as ire
now in vogue. It is. believed that a r 'ire
fundamental reorganization can be mad " -
and sooner or later will have to be made -
which will provide not only for the presc it
overcrowding, but correct apparent defects
in procedure and also relieve the county
court of its civil and criminal cases-
leaving it as a probate court. The county
court is one of the most efficiently admin-
istered public offices we have, but probate
work is given preference, and it is thought
that should the civil and criminal cases
now coming within its jurisdiction be
heard in some other court an all around
improvement would be made.
Creation of municipal courts, which
would be courts of record, replacing en-
tirely the present justice of the peace
courts, and with jurisdiction over all cases
except probate now brought in the county
court is the remedy suggested. An outline
of the practice in municipal courts of two
other cities may assist in a determination
as to whether or not such a system of
courts would be desirable or practicable
in Denver.
The municipal courts of Chicago and
Cleveland are the most recently organized,
and the most modern of their kind func-
tioning in the United States at this time.
Chicago's municipal court is more elab-
orately organized, and has a greater range
